Resolution of misconception of overfitting: Differentiating learning curves from Occam curves

Preamble 

Occam (Wikipedia)

A misconception that overfitted model can be identified with the  amount of generalisation gap between model's training and test sets over its learning curves is still out there. Even in some prominent online lectures and blog posts, this misconception is now repeated without critical look. In general, this practice unfortunately diffuse into some academic papers and industrial,  practitioners attribute poor generalisation to overfitting. We have provided a resolution of this via a new conceptual identification of complexity plots, so called Occam's curves differentiating from a learning curve. An accessible mathematical definitions here will clarify the resolution of the confusion.   

Learning Curve Setting: Generalisation Gap 

Learning curves explain how a given algorithm's generalisation improves over time or experience, originating from Ebbinghaus's work on human memory.  We use inductive bias to express a model, as model can manifest itself in different forms from differential equations to deep learning.

Definition: Given inductive bias $\mathscr{M}$ formed by $n$ datasets with monotonically increasing sizes  $\mathbb{T} = \{|\mathbb{T}_{0}| > |\mathbb{T}_{1}| > ...> |\mathbb{T}_{n}| \}$. A learning curve $\mathscr{L}$ for $\mathscr{M}$ is expressed by the performance measure of the model over datasets,  $\mathbb{p} = \{ p_{0},  p_{1}, ... p_{n} \}$, hence $\mathscr{L}$ is a curve on the plane of $(\mathbb{T}, p)$.  

By this definition, we deduce that $\mathscr{M}$ learns if $\mathscr{L}$ increases monotonically. 

A generalisation gap is defined as follows. 

Definition: Generalisation gap for inductive bias $\mathscr{M}$ is the difference between its' learning curve $\mathscr{L}$ and the learning curve of the unseen datasets, i.e., so-called training, $\mathscr{L}^{train}$. The difference can be simple difference, or a measure differentiating the gap.

We conjecture the following. 

Conjecture: Generalisation gap can't identify if $\mathscr{M}$ is an overfitted model. Overfitting is about Occam's razor, and requires a pairwise comparison between two inductive biases of different complexities.

As conjecture suggests that generalisation gap is not about overfitting, despite the common misconception. Then, why the misconception? The misconception lies on the confusion of how to produce the curve that we could judge overfitting. 

Occam Curves: Overfitting Gap [Occam's Gap] 

In the case of generating Occam curves, a complexity measure  $\mathscr{C}$  over different inductive biases $\mathscr{M_{i}}$ plays a role. Then the definition reads. 

Definition: Given $m$ inductive bias $\mathscr{M_{i}}$ formed by $n$ datasets with monotonically increasing sizes  $\mathbb{T} = \{|\mathbb{T}_{0}| > |\mathbb{T}_{1}| > ...> |\mathbb{T}_{n}| \}$. An Occam curve $\mathscr{O}$ for a given $\mathscr{M}$ is expressed by the performance measure of the model over complexity-dataset size points  $\mathbb{F} = [(|\mathbb{T}_{0}|, \mathscr{C}),  (|\mathbb{T}_{1}| , \mathscr{C}), ...,  (|\mathbb{T}_{n}| , \mathscr{C}) ] $; Performance of a given inductive bias reads $\mathbb{p} = \{ p_{0},  p_{1}, ... p_{n} \}$, hence Occam curve, $\mathscr{O}$ is a curve on the plane of $(\mathbb{F}, p)$.  

 

Given definition, producing Occam curves are more complicated than simply plotting test and train curves over batches. The ordering in $\mathbb{F}$ forms what is so-called goodness of rank.

Summary and take home

Resolution of misconception of overfitting lies in producing Occam curves to judge the bias-variance tradeoff, not the learning curves of a single model. 

Further reading & notes

• Further posts and a glossary : The concept of overgeneralisation and goodness of rank.
• Double decent phenomenon, it uses Occam's curves, not learning curves.
• We use dataset size as an interpretation of increasing experience, there could be other ways of expressing a gained experience, but we take the most obvious evidence.

Please cite as follows:

 @misc{suezen23rmo, 

     title = {Resolution of misconception of overfitting: Differentiating learning curves from Occam curves}, 

     howpublished = {\url{https://science-memo.blogspot.com/2023/04/Occam-curves.html}}, 

     author = {Mehmet Süzen},

     year = {2023}

}  

Postscript notes

Take home messages

Understanding Generalisation Gap and Occam’s gap

Model selection and evaluations are usually confused by novice and as well as experienced data scientists and professionals doing modelling. There are a lot of misconceptions in the literature, but in practice primary take home messages can be summarised as follows:

1. What is a model? A model is an “inductive bias” of the modeller, a selected parametrised functions for example, a neural network architecture choice. Contrary to many, specific parametrisation of a model (deep learning architecture) is not a different model.
2. A model’s test and training performance difference is about generalisation gap. Overfitting and under-fitting is not about generalisation gap.
3. Overfitting or under-fitting is a comparison problem: How a model deviates from a reference model? This is called Occam’s gap or so called model selection error.
4. Occam’s gap generalises Empirical Risk minimisation over a learning curve.  Empirical risk minimisation itself is not about learning.

How and when a model generalises well and generalisation of empirical risk minimisation are currently an open research topics.

Loschimidt's Paradox and Causality: Can we establish Pearlian expression for Boltzmann's H-theorem?

Boltzmann (Wikipedia)

• Post covers the papers: H-theorem do-conjecture, M. Süzen,  arxiv:2310.01458 (2023) 

Preamble

Probably the most important achievement for humans is the ability to produce scientific discoveries, that  helps us objectively understand how nature works and build artificial tools where no other species can.  Entropy is an elusive concept and one of the crown achievements of human race. We question here if causal inference and Loschmidt's paradox can be reconciled. 

Mimicking analogies are not physical

Before even try to understand what is a physical entropy, we should make sure that there is only one kind of physical entropy from thermodynamics, formulated by Gibbs-Boltzmann ($S_{G}$ and $S_{B}$).  Other entropies such as Shannon's information entropy are all analogies to physics, and mimicking concepts.

Why counting microstates are associated with time?

The following definition of entropy is due to Boltzmann but Gibbs' formulation tend to provide equivalence, technically different formulations aside, they are actually equivalent.

Definition 1: An entropy of a macroscopic material is associated with larger number of states its constituted elements take different states, $\Omega$. This is associated with $S_{B}$, Boltzmann's entropy.  

Now, as we know from basic thermodynamics classes that entropy change of a system can not decrease, so the time's arrow. 

Definition 2: Time's arrow is identified with change in entropy of material systems, that $\delta S \ge 0$.

We put aside the distinction between open and close systems and equilibrium and non-equilibrium dynamics, but concentrate on how come counting system's state's are associated with time's arrow? 

Loschimidt's Paradox: Irreversible occupancy on discrete states and causal inference

The core idea probably can be explained via discrete lattice and occupancy on them over chain of dynamics. 

Conjecture 1: Occupancy of $N$ items on $M$ discrete states, $M>N$, evolving with dynamical rules $\mathscr{D}$ necessarily increases $\Omega$, compare to the number of sampling if it were $M=N$. 

This conjecture might explain the entropy increase, but irreversibility of the dynamical rule $\mathscr{D}$ is required addressing Loschimidt's Paradox, i.e., how to generate irreversible evolution given time-reversal dynamics. Actually, do-calculus may provide a language to resolve this, by inducing interventional notation on Boltzmann's H-theorem with Pearlian view. The full definition of H-function is a bit more involved, but here we summarise it in condensed form with a do operator version of it.

Conjecture 2 (H-Theorem do-conjecture): Boltzmann's H-function provides a basis for entropy increase, it is associated with conditional probability of a system $\mathscr{S}$ being in state $X$ on ensemble $\mathscr{E}$. Hence, $P(X|\mathscr{E})$. Then, an irreversible evolution from time-reversal dynamics should use interventional notation, $P(X|do(\mathscr{E}))$. Then information on how time reversal dynamics leads to time's arrow encoded on, how dynamics provides an interventional ensembles, $do(\mathscr{E})$.

Conclusion

We provided some hints on why would counting states lead to time's arrow, an irreversible dynamics.  In the light of the development of mathematical language for causal inference in statistics, the concepts are converging. Along with understanding Loschmidt's Paradox via do-calculus, it can establish an asymmetric notation. Loschmidt's question is long standing problem in physics and philosophy with great practical implications in different physical sciences.

Further reading

• Loschimid's Paradox
• H-Theorem
• do-Calculus revisited, J. Pearl (2012) pdf
• Causal Inference : Looper Repository for collection of resources.
• H-theorem do-conjecture, M. Süzen,  arxiv:2310.01458 (2023) 

Please cite as follows:

 @misc{suezen23lpc, 

     title = {Loschimidt's Paradox and Causality: Can we establish Pearlian expression for Bolztmann's H-theorem?}, 

     howpublished = {\url{https://science-memo.blogspot.com/2023/02/loschimidts-do-calculus.html}}, 

     author = {Mehmet Süzen},

     year = {2023}

}  

@article{suzen23htd,

    title={H-theorem do-conjecture},

    author={Mehmet Süzen},

    preprint={arXiv:2310.01458},

    url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.01458}

    year={2023}

}

The concept of overgeneralisation and goodness of rank : Overfitting is not about comparing training and test learning curves

Preamble 

    Walt Disney Hall,
Los Angeles  (Wikipedia)

Unfortunately, it is still thought in machine learning classes that overfitting can be detected by comparing training and test learning curves on the single model's performance.  The origins of this misconception is unknown. Looks like an urban legend has been diffused into main practice  and  even in academic works the misconception taken granted. Overfitting's definition appeared to be inherently about comparing complexities of two (or more) models. Models manifest themself as inductive biases modeller or data scientist inform in their tasks. This makes overfitting in reality a Bayesian concept at its core.  It is not about comparing training and test learning curves that if model is following a noise, but pairwise model comparison-testing procedure to select  more plausable belief among our beliefs that has the least information: entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity i.e., Occam's razor. We introduce a new concept in clarifying this practically, goodness of rank to distinguish from well known goodness of fit, and clarify concepts and provide steps to attribute models with overfitted or under-fitted models.

Poorly generalised model : Overgeneralisation or under-generalisation

The practice that is described in machine learning classes, and  practiced in industry that overfitting is about your model following training set closely but fails to generalised in test set. This is not overfitted model but a model that fails to generalise: a phenomena should be called Overgeneralisation (or under-generalisation). 

A procedure to detect overfitted model : Goodness of rank

We have provided complexity based abstract description of model selection procedure, here as complexity ranking: we will repeat this procedure with identification of the overfilled model explicitly.

In the following steps a sketch of an algorithmic recipe for complexity ranking of inductive biases via informal steps, overfitted model identification explicitly:

1. Define a complexity measure $\mathscr{C}$($\mathscr{M}$) over an inductive bias.
2. Define a generalisation measure  $\mathscr{G}$($\mathscr{M}$, $\mathscr{D}$) over and inductive bias and dataset.
3. Select a set of inductive biases, at least-two, $\mathscr{M}_{1}$ and $\mathscr{M}_{2}$.
4. Produce complexity and generalisation measures on ($\mathscr{M}$, $\mathscr{D}$): Here for two inductive biases: $\mathscr{C}_{1}$, $\mathscr{C}_{2}$,   $\mathscr{G}_{1}$, $\mathscr{G}_{2}$.
5. Ranking of  $\mathscr{M}_{1}$ and $\mathscr{M}_{2}$:  $argmax \{ \mathscr{G}_{1}, \mathscr{G}_{2}\}$ and $argmin \{ \mathscr{C}_{1}, \mathscr{C}_{2}\}$ 
6. $\mathscr{M}_{1}$ is an overfitted model compare to $\mathscr{M}_{2}$   if $\mathscr{G}_{1} <= \mathscr{G}_{2}$ and   $\mathscr{C}_{1} \gt \mathscr{C}_{2}$. 
7. $\mathscr{M}_{2}$ is an overfitted model compare to $\mathscr{M}_{1}$ if $\mathscr{G}_{2} <= \mathscr{G}_{1}$ and   $\mathscr{C}_{2} \gt \mathscr{C}_{1}$.
8. $\mathscr{M}_{1}$ is an underfitted model compare to $\mathscr{M}_{2}$   if $\mathscr{G}_{1} < \mathscr{G}_{2}$ and   $\mathscr{C}_{1} < \mathscr{C}_{2}$.
9. $\mathscr{M}_{2}$ is an underfitted model compare to $\mathscr{M}_{1}$   if $\mathscr{G}_{2} < \mathscr{G}_{1}$ and   $\mathscr{C}_{2} < \mathscr{C}_{1}$.

If two model has the same complexity, then much better generalised model should be selected, in this case we can't conclude that either model is overfitted but generalised differently. Remembering that overfitting is about complexity ranking : Goodness of rank.

But overgeneralisation sounded like overfitting, isn't it?

Operationally overgeneralisation and overfitting implies two different things. Overgeneralisation operationally can be detected with a single model. Because, we can measure the generalisation performance of the model alone with data, in statistical literature this is called goodness of fit. Moreover overgeneralisation can also be called under-generalisation, as both implies poor generalisation performance.

However, overfitting implies a model overly performed compare to an other model i.e., model overfits but compare to what? Practically speaking, overgeneralisation can be detected via holdout method, but not overfitting. Overfitting goes beyond goodness of fit to goodness of rank as we provided recipe as pairwise model comparison.

Conclusion

The practice of comparing training and test learning curves for overfitting diffused into machine learning so deeply, the concept is almost always thought a bit in a fuzzy-way, even in distinguished lectures explicitly. Older textbooks and papers correctly identifies overfitting as comparison problem. As a practitioner, if we bear in mind that overfitting is about complexity ranking and it requires more than one model or inductive bias in order to be identified, then we are in better shape in selecting better model. Overfitting can not be detected via data alone on a single model.  

Further reading

Some of the posts, reverse chronological order, that this blog have tried to convey what overfitting entails and its general implications. 

• Overfitting is about complexity ranking of inductive biases : Algorithmic recipe
• Empirical risk minimization is not learning :A mathematical definition of learning and re-understanding of overfitting and Occam's razor in machine learning
• Critical look on why deployed machine learning model performance degrade quickly.
• Bringing back Occam's razor to modern connectionist machine learning.
• Understanding overfitting: an inaccurate meme in Machine Learning

Glossary 

To make things clear, we provide concept definitions.

Generalisation A concept that if model can perform as good as the data it has not seen before, however seen here is a bit vague, it could have seen data points that are close to the data would be better suited in the context of supervised learning as oppose to compositional learning.

Goodness of fit An approach to check if model is generalised well.  

Goodness of rank An approach to check if model is overfitted or under-fitted comparable to other models.

Holdout method A metod to build a model on the portion of available data and measure the goodness of fit on the holdout part of the data, i.e., test and train.

Inductive bias  A set of assumptions data scientist made in building a representation of the real world, this manifest as model and the assumptions that come with a model.

Model  A model is a biased view of the reality from data scientist. Usually appears as a function of observables $X$ and parameters $\Theta$, $f(X, \Theta)$. The different values of $\Theta$ do not constitute a different model.  See also  What is a statistical model?,  Peter McCullagh 

Occam's razor (Principle of parsimony)  A principle that less complex explanation reflects reality better. Entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity.  

Overgeneralisation (Under-generalisation) If we have a good performance on the training set but very bad performance on the test set, model said to overgeneralise or under-generalise; as a result of goodness of fit testing, i.e., comparing learning curves over test and train datasets.

Regularisation An approach to augment model to improve generalisation.

Postscript Notes

Note: Occam’s razor is a ranking problem: Generalisation is not 

The holy grail of machine learning in practice is hold-out methods. We want to make sure that we don’t overgeneralise. However, a misconception has been propagated that overgeneralisation is mistakenly thought of as synonymous with overfitting. Overfitting has a different connotation as ranking different models rather than measuring the generalisation ability of a single model. The generalisation gap between training and test sets is not about Occam’s razor. 

The conditional query fallacy: Applying Bayesian inference from discrete mathematics perspective

Preamble

    The Tilled Field,
Joan Miró
(Wikipedia)

One of the core concepts in data sciences is conditional probabilities, $p(x|y)$ appear as logical description of many of the tasks, such as formulating regression or as a core concept in Bayesian Inference. However, there is operationally no special meaning of a conditional or joint probabilities as their arguments are no more than a compositional event statements. This raise a question: Is there any fundamental relationship between Bayesian Inference and discrete mathematics that is practically relevant to us as practitioners? Since, both topics are based on discrete statements returning a Boolean variables. Unfortunately, the answer to this question is a rabbit hole and probably even an open research.  There is no clearly established connections between discrete mathematics fundamentals and Bayesian Inference.  

Statement mappings as definition of probability 

Statement is a logical description of some events, or set of events. Let's have a semi-formal description of such statements.

Definition: A mathematical or logical statement formed with boolean relationships $\mathscr{R}$ (conjunctions) among set of events $\mathscr{E}$,  so a statement $\mathbb{S}$ is formed with at least a tuple of $\langle \mathscr{R},  \mathscr{E} \rangle$. 

Relationships can be any binary operator and events could explain anything perceptional, i.e., a discretised existence. This is the core discrete mathematics and almost all problems in this domain formed in this setting from defining functions to graph theory. A probability is no exception and definition naturally follows, as so called statement mapping.

Definition: A probability $\mathbb{P}$ is a statement mapping, $\mathbb{P}: \mathbb{S} \rightarrow [0,1]$. 

The interpretation of this definitions that a logical statement is always True if probability is 1 and always False if it is 0. However, having conditionals based on this is not that clear cut.

Conditional Query Fallacy 

A non-commutative statement may imply, reversing the order of statements should not yield to the same filtered set on the data for Bayesian Inference. However, Bayes' theorem would have a fallacy for statement mappings for conditionals in this sense. 

Definition: The conditional query fallacy is defined as one can not update belief in probability, because reversing order of statements in conditional probabilities halts Bayes' update,  i.e., back to back query results into the same dataset for inference.

At first glance, this appears as a Bayes' rule does not support commutative property, practically posterior being equal to likelihood.  However, this fallacy appears to be a notational misdirection. Inference on the filtered dataset back to back constituting a conditional fallacy i.e., when a query language is used to filter data to get A|B and B|A yielding to the same dataset regardless of filtering order. 

Although, in inference with data, likelihood is actually not a conditional probability, strictly speaking and not a filtering operation. It is merely a measure of update rule. We compute likelihood by multiplying values obtained by i.i.d. samples inserted into conjugate prior, a distribution is involved. Hence, the likelihood computationally is not really a reversal of conditional as in $P(A|B)$ written as reversed, $P(B|A)$.  

Outlook

In computing conditional probabilities for Bayesian Inference, our primary assumption is that conditional probabilities; likelihood and posterior are not identical. Discrete mathematics only allows Bayesian updates, if time evolution is explicitly stated with non-commutative statements for conditionals.

Going back to our initial question, indeed there is a deep connection between the fundamentals of discrete mathematics and Bayesian belief update on events as logical statements. The fallacy sounds a trivial error in judgement but (un)fortunately goes into philosophical definitions of probability that simultaneous tracking of time and sample space is not encoded in any of the notations explicitly, making statement filtering definition of probability a bit shaky.

Glossary of concepts

Statement Mapping A given set of mathematical statements mapped into a domain of numbers.

Probability A statement mapping, where domain is $\mathscr{D} = [0,1]$.

Conditional query fallacy Differently put than the above definition. Thinking that two conditional probabilities as reversed statements of each other in Bayesian inference, yields to the same dataset regardless of time-ordering of the queries.

Notes and further reading

• Fallacy is one computes $P(A|B)=P(B|A)$, while filtering results into identical datasets. Correction would be that, one needs to use different sample sizes for reverse statement or compute joints and marginals separately on their own filtered datasets. Use the first filtering sample size in computing the probability not the total.
• Here, discrete mathematics we refer to appears within arguments of probability. The discussion of discrete parameter estimations are a different topic. Gelman discusses this, here.
• Conjunction Fallacy
• Probability Interpretations
• Bayesian rabbit holes: Decoding conditional probability with non-commutative algebra M. Süzen (2022)
• Holes in Bayesian Statistics Gelman-Yao (2021) : This is a beautifully written article. Specially, proposal that context dependence should be used instead of subjective
• John Allen Paulos’s  Innumeracy: Mathematical Illiteracy and Its Consequences, 

• Random House (1988).  Interestingly Paullos mentions fallacies regarding the conditional probabilities. 

  An oldy book on numerical fallacies but goodie.    

Overfitting is about complexity ranking of inductive biases : Algorithmic recipe

Preamble

    Figure: Moon patterns
human brain
 invents. (Wikipedia)

Detecting overfitting is inherently a comparison problem of the complexity of multiple objects, i.e., models or an algorithm capable of making predictions. A model is overfitted (underfitted) if we only compare it to another model. Model selection involves comparing multiple models with different complexities. The summary of this approach with basic mathematical definitions is given here.

Misconceptions: Poor generalisation is not synonymous with overfitting. 

None of these techniques would prevent us from overfitting: Cross-validation, having more data, early stopping, and comparing test-train learning curves are all about generalisation. Their purpose is not to detect overfitting.

We need at least two different models, i.e., two different inductive biases, to judge which model is overfitted. One distinct approach in deep learning, called dropout, prevents overfitting while it alternates between multiple models, i.e., multiple inductive bias. For judgment, dropout implementation has to compare those alternating model test performances during training to judge overfitting. 

What is an inductive bias? 

There are multiple inceptions of inductive bias. Here, we concentrate on a parametrised model, $\mathscr{M}(\theta)$ on a dataset $\mathscr{D}$, the selection of a model type, or modelling approach, usually manifest as a functional form $\mathscr{M}=f(x)$ or as a function approximation, i.e., for example neural network, are all manifestation of inductive biases. Different parameterisation of model learned on the subsets of the dataset are still the same inductive bias.

Complexity ranking of inductive biases: An Algorithmic recipe 

We are sketching out an algorithmic recipe for complexity ranking of inductive biases via informal steps:

1. Define a complexity measure $\mathscr{C}$($\mathscr{M}$) over an inductive bias.
2. Define a generalisation measure  $\mathscr{G}$($\mathscr{M}$, $\mathscr{D}$) over and inductive bias and dataset.
3. Select a set of inductive biases, at least-two, $\mathscr{M}_{1}$ and $\mathscr{M}_{2}$.
4. Produce complexity and generalisation measures on ($\mathscr{M}$, $\mathscr{D}$): Here for two inductive biases: $\mathscr{C}_{1}$, $\mathscr{C}_{2}$,   $\mathscr{G}_{1}$, $\mathscr{G}_{2}$.
5. Ranking of  $\mathscr{M}_{1}$ and $\mathscr{M}_{2}$:  $argmax \{ \mathscr{G}_{1}, \mathscr{G}_{2}\}$ and $argmin \{ \mathscr{C}_{1}, \mathscr{C}_{2}\}$

The core concept appears as when generalisations are close enough we pick out the inductive bias that is less complex. 

Conclusion & Outlook

In practice,  probably due to hectic delivery constraints, or mere laziness, we still rely on simple holdout method to build models, only single test and train split, not even learning curves, specially in deep learning models without practicing Occam's razor. A major insight in this direction appears to be that, holdout approach can only help us to detect generalisation, not overfitting. We clarify this via the concept of inductive bias distinguishing that different parametrisation of the same model doesn't change the inductive bias introduced by the modelling choice. 

In fact, due to resource constraints of model life-cycle, i.e., energy consumption and cognitive load of introducing a complex model, practicing proper Occam's razor: complexity ranking of inductive biases, is much more important than ever for sustainable environment and human capital.

Further reading

Some of the posts, reverse chronological order, that this blog have tried to convey what overfitting entails and its general implications. 

• Empirical risk minimization is not learning :A mathematical definition of learning and re-understanding of overfitting and Occam's razor in machine learning
• Critical look on why deployed machine learning model performance degrade quickly.
• Bringing back Occam's razor to modern connectionist machine learning.
• Understanding overfitting: an inaccurate meme in Machine Learning

Bayesian rabbit holes: Decoding conditional probability with non-commutative algebra

Preamble

    The White Rabbit
(Wikipedia)

A novice analyst or even experienced (data) scientist would have thought that the bar notation $|$ in representing conditional probability carries some different operational mathematics. Primarily when written in explicit distribution functions $p(x|y)$. Similar approach applies to joint probabilities such as $p(x, y)$ too. One could see a mixture of these, such as $p(x, y | z)$. In this short exposition, we clarify that none of these identifications within arguments of probability do have any different resulting operational meaning. 

Arguments in probabilities: Boolean statement and filtering 

Arguments in any probability are mathematical statements of discrete mathematics that correspond to events in the experimental setting. These are statements declaring some facts with a boolean outcome. These statements are queries to a data set. Such as, if the temperature is above $30$ degrees, $T > 30$. Temperature $T$ is a random variable. Unfortunately, the term random variable is often used differently in many textbooks. It is defined as a mapping rather than as a single variable. The bar $|$ in conditional probability $p(x|y)$, implies statement $x$ given that statement $y$ has already occurred, i.e., if. This interpretation implies that $y$ first occurred before $x$, but it doesn't imply that they are causally linked. The condition plays a role in filtering, a where clause in query languages. $p(x|y)$ boils down to $p_{y}(x)$, where the first statement $y$ is applied to the dataset before computing the probability on the remaining statement $x$.

In the case of joint probabilities $p(x, y)$, events co-occur, i.e., AND statement. In summary, anything in the argument of $p$ is written as a mathematical statement. In the case of assigning a distribution or a functional form to $p$, there is no particular role for conditionals or joints; the modelling approach sets an appropriate structure.

Conditioning does not imply casual direction: do-Calculus do

A filtering interpretation of conditional $p(x|y)$ does not imply causal direction, but $do$ operator does, $p(x|do(y))$. 

Non-commutative algebra: When frequentist are equivalent to Bayesian

Most of the simple filtering operations would result in identical results if reversed. $p(x|y) = p(y|x)$, prior being equal to posterior. This remark implies we can't apply Bayesian learning with commutative statements. We need non-commutative statements; as a result, one can do Bayesian learning with the newly arriving data, i.e., the arrival of new subjective evidence. The reason seems to be due to the frequentist nature of filtering.

Outlook 

Even though we provided some revelations on decoding the operational meaning of conditional probabilities, we suggested that any conditional, joint or any combination of these within the argument of probabilities has no operational purpose other than pre-processing steps. However, the philosophical and practical implications of probabilistic reasoning are always counterintuitive. Probabilistic reasoning is a complex problem computationally. From a causal inference perspective, we are better equipped to tackle these issues with do-Bayesian analysis.  

Further reading

• Discrete Mathematics, Oscar Levin
• Causal Inference in Statistics, A Primer, Judea Pearl, Madelyn Glymour, Nicholas P. Jewell
• Indicative Conditionals Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
• Bayesian Epistemology Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 

Please Cite as:

 @misc{suezen22brh, 

     title = {Bayesian rabbit holes: Decoding conditional probability with non-commutative algebra}, 

     howpublished = {\url{https://science-memo.blogspot.com/2022/07/bayesian-conditional-noncommutative.html}}, 

     author = {Mehmet Süzen},

     year = {2022}

}  

N-body wave function has no meaning but shut up and calculate: quantum bayesianism

During my graduate school years I was lucky to be assigned on reporting a technique used in computational quantum chemistry, namely resolution of identity.  It is a simple trick to approximate many integrals with a smaller one. I don't want to discuss about this trick but rather a peculiar idea, if not controversial,  I come up during preparation of that report (here). It is about the legitimacy of wave function in many electron, let's be brave and say N-body, physical systems. Argument is posed by Walter Kohn, Nobel Physicist, in his lecture (here) attributed to Van Vleck:

I begin with a provocative statement. In general the
many-electron wave function $\Psi(r_{1} , . . . ,r_{N} )$ for a system
of $N$ electrons is not a legitimate scientific concept, when
$N \ge N_{0}$ , where $N_{0} = 10^{3}$ .

I believe this argument has a profound implication in interpretation of quantum mechanics. However,  sadly, perception of quantum mechanics in many circles of scientific community is limited to Schrödinger equation and interpretations based on wave function. Specially the concept of wave function collapse. In my view these approaches does not make any sense for macroscopic systems such as, humans. Considering Kohn's statement. I can only see the relevance in quantum computing where really small physical systems are in consideration. (Also see my previous post, pointing out recent works in constructing quantum mechanics without wave function)

One prominent figure in recent times is distinguished Professor Mermin who popularised the short version of Copenhagen interpretation as : 'shut up and calculate' and developer of the ithaka interpretation . Very recently discusses about quantum Bayesianism (here). Again, using Kohn's statement we have to be careful not to extent this concept, again, to macroscopic systems like Humans' or even larger atomic systems, like measurement devices. So, replacing a quantum measurement device with a human observer is a mistake, if not a sin. Doesn't matter even if they have a fancy names like Bob or Alice. Because a measurement device big enough has no defined or meaningful wave function hence any kind of  "quantum probability",  i.e., no superposition to observed systems can be established. Probably, problem lies in the transition from microscopic to macroscopic system. There was a large effort in this direction (here).

What ever you believe and read about quantum mechanics. I can only suggest that your crap detectors must function fully all the time when you hear some one talk about quantum mechanics and its interpretation, including this post. I recommend you Neil Postman's article Bullshit and the Art of Crap-Detection.

PS: Recently, there was an interesting cartoon on xkcd saying that we can safely ignore any phrase that starts with "According to quantum mechanics...".